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ABSTRACT: The article discusses the experience of creation of peacekeeping missions in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Eastern Slavonia, Kosovo and East Timor with the use of comparative method. 
It also raises the role of international and regional actors in post-conflict peacebuilding. The 
author presents some practical solutions for the implementation of the effective peace process in 
eastern Ukraine, aimed at the reintegration of temporarily occupied territories. 
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MIĘDZYNARODOWA ADMINISTRACJA W DONBASIE: SPOSOBY 
IMPLEMENTACJI  NA PODSTAWIE DOŚWIADCZEŃ PROCESÓW 
POKOJOWYCH NA BAŁKANACH I W TIMORZE WSCHODNIM 
ABSTRAKT: W artykule omówiono doświadczenia związane z funkcjonowaniem misji pokojowych 
w Bośni i Hercegowinie, Wschodniej Slawonii, Kosowie i Timorze Wschodnim, przy 
wyjorzystaniu analizy porównawczej. Autor odnosi się do roli międzynarodowych i regionalnych 
podmiotów w budowaniu pokoju po zakończeniu konfliktu. Przedstawia również praktyczne 
rozwiązania dotyczące wdrożenia skutecznego procesu pokojowego we wschodniej Ukrainie, 
mającego na celu reintegrację tymczasowo okupowanych terytoriów. 
SŁOWA KLUCZOWE: misja pokojowa, administracja międzynarodowa, konflikt zbrojny, 
porozumienie pokojowe 
 
 
The necessity of implementation of peacekeeping mission in Donbas becomes more and 
more evident for Ukraine. Political and diplomatic settlement of the armed conflict in the east 
of the country also meets commitments on peaceful solution of the conflict, undertaken by our 
country in the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (article 9). 
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Ukraine’s aspiration to peaceful way of deoccupation and reintegration of territories in 
the east of Ukraine was set forth in numerous documents: 
- in the so-called “Minsk agreements”: Minsk Protocol of 05.09.2014, Minsk 
Memorandum of 19.09.2014 and Package of Measures for the Implementation of the 
Minsk Agreements of 12.02.2015; 
- Decree of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine No. 253-VIII of 17.03.2015 “On Approval of 
Appeals in the Name of Ukraine to the Security Council of the United Nation 
Organization and the Council of European Union concerning unfolding international 
operation on support of peace and safety in Ukraine”; 
- Law of Ukraine No. 2167-VIII of 06.10.2017 “On Creation of Necessary Conditions for 
Regulating the Situation in Certain Areas of Donetsk and Luhansk Regions” 
(hereinafter CADLR). 
Moreover, for the implementation of Minsk Agreements the Parliament adopted the 
Law “On Special Order of Local Self-Government in Certain Areas of Donetsk and Luhansk 
Regions” as far back as 16.09.2014. 
Why in spite of the steps taken by our country the process of peaceful reintegration of 
CADRL could not be launched within five years? Which steps are to be taken and, what is most 
important, what kind of actors are to be involved to launch peacekeeping mission in Donbas? 
To answer the above questions let us take a brief look at the experience of launching 
peacekeeping missions in other armed conflicts, their common features and differences in 
relation to each other and at the situation in Ukraine using comparative approach. When 
choosing appropriate cases we shall take the following criteria into account: subject, the 
organization under the auspices of which the mission is implemented, mission mandate, 
mission success in post-conflict regulation. 
The appeals for the implementation of peacekeeping mission not just with security 
potential, but first of all with wide administrative powers, i.e. international interim 
(or transitional) administration can be heard with increasing frequency in Ukraine
1
. 
The necessity of creation of transitional administration in Donbas was also expressed by the 
special representative of the US Department of State Kurt Volker in his interview for the radio 
station “Echo of Moscow”
2
. The original offers concerning the mechanisms of international 
transitional administration in CADRL, aimed at the intensification of Minsk process, were 
received from the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe
3
. 
The examples of immediate international civil-military administration of territories are 
UN missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Eastern Slavonia, Kosovo and East Timor. All these 
missions were implemented in 1990s as the reaction of the world community to the 
                                                          
1
 Vide: В МінТОТ назвали головні умови забезпечення миру на Донбасі, http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=2BbTPgaLoiQ (11.03.2019). 
2
 Vide: Интервью Курта Волкера, http://echo.msk.ru/programs/beseda/2283826-echo/ (11.03.2019). 
3
 В ОБСЄ розповіли про новий план щодо Донбасу на заміну Мінським угодам, http://www.pravda.co 
m.ua/news/2019/01/28/7205089/ (11.03.2019). 
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protracting ethnopolitical conflicts with numerous victims, which had no other solution except 
for temporary delegation of sovereign power to UN authorities. According to Gregory Fox, 
the missions were designed to move beyond mere conflict resolution and address the root 
causes of political dysfunction in states. They seek to create institutions designed to redirect 
group hostilities into democratic processes. The effort to replace war with politics gave rise to 
the term ‘‘peace-building”
4
. 
First of all, it should be noted that all the four missions were approved by respective 
resolutions of the UN Security Council. Presently Ukraine is credited with one UN Security 
Council Resolution No. 2202 of 17.02.2015, which approves the Package of Measures for the 
Implementation of the Minsk Agreements of 12.02.2015. This resolution, unlike resolutions 
related to the countries of former Yugoslavia and East Timor, does not provide for creation of 
peacekeeping mission under the auspices of the UN and the more so the implementation of 
the regime of international administration in the occupied areas of Donbas. To cut it short the 
political part of resolution and Minsk Agreements is reduced to giving special status to 
CADRL and holding extraordinary local elections
5
. According to the opinion of experts of 
International Centre for Policy Studies, institutionalization of Ukrainian crisis as an internal 
conflict between Ukraine and CADRL as a result of signing Minsk Agreements makes it 
impossible to unfold peace-enforcement mission at this stage as Russia is de facto an 
aggressor country and was de jure removed from the conflict by the UNSC Resolution 2202 
and the regulation of the conflict through fulfillment of Minsk Agreements is an obligation of 
Ukraine, recorded by the UN Security Council
6
. 
Secondly, as it has been demonstrated by the experience of creating UN peacekeeping 
missions, parties to a conflict are to reach an agreement on certain stepwise mechanisms of 
peaceful regulation, including rebuilding political institutions and establishing democratic 
regime in post-conflict territories. The Dayton Agreements dated 1995 and Rambouillet 
Agreements dated 1999 even included new constitutions for Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Kosovo respectively. These agreements involved not only UN transitional administration, but 
also interested regional subjects as actors to the political process. Thus, UN mission in 
Kosovo (UNMIK) included four components: the UN was responsible for law and order and 
civil administration, Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE) was 
responsible for democratization and institution building, European Union (EU) was 
responsible for economic reconstruction
7
. 
The only exception was the so-called “Erdut Agreement” of 15.11.1995, signed by the 
Prime-Minister of Croatia of that time, Hrvoje Šarinić, and the representative of separatist 
                                                          
4
 G. Fox. Humanitarian Occupation, Cambridge 2008, p. 9. 
5
 UN Security Council Resolution 2202 (Feb. 17, 2015), http://undocs.org/en/S/RES/2202(2015) (11.03.2019). 
6
 В. Філіпчук, Міжнародна миротворчість та війна на Сході України: чи є точки дотику?: 
превентивна дипломатія, миротворчість, підтримка миру та миробудівництво у врегулюванні 
«Українського конфлікту», Київ 2016, с. 20. 
7
 United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), http://peacekeeping.un.org/en/miss 
ion/unmik (11.03.2019). 
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Serb Krajina, which provided for peaceful end of the war in Croatia and transitional period for 
reintegration of its territories by Serbian own forces. This small document was of 
approximately the same volume as Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk 
Agreements (14 items vs 13). The Erdut Agreement provided for unfolding of the United 
Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium 
(UNTAES), which was exercise control over the region in the transitional period, including 
the organization of holding elections to all local authorities
8
. It should be noted that neither 
the agreement, nor the UNSC Resolution 1033 (1995), by which UNTAES was established, 
provided for any special status for these territories for pro-Serbian powers. The Erdut 
Agreement delegated wide discretionary powers for international administration also in 
security area by providing for demilitarization of the region “according to the schedule and 
procedures determined by the international force”
9
. In contrast, Minsk Agreements do not 
provide for which subject(s) are going to exercise authoritative powers in transitional period, 
in particular, who is responsible for the organization and holding of local elections in 
CADRL, how the illegitimate authorities of occupation administration of the Russian 
Federation in Donetsk and Luhansk Regions are to be dissolved, how the issues of returning 
of internally displaced persons and of the residential property and other property, which was 
lost due to occupation, etc. are to be solved. Gaps in normative regulation of these issues and 
constant appeals on the part of Russia that Ukraine has to reach direct agreements with the so-
called “DPR” and “LPR”, obviously block the launch of peacekeeping process in Donbas. 
Therefore, the Erdut Agreement and Minsk Agreements have significant differences, 
witnessing of far more advantageous position of Croatia as compared to Ukraine. For Ukraine 
the variant of signing new agreement with pro-Russian powers in Donbas is unacceptable, as 
it will have negative consequences in form of legitimization of the “DPR” and “LPR” as 
independent political actors. Moreover, the mission in Croatia from the start was not aimed at 
giving of special status for post-conflict territories, unlike Rambouillet Agreements for 
Kosovo or Minsk Agreements for CADRL. E.g., UNTAES Transitional Administrator in 
1996-1997, Jacques Paul Klein, declared expressly to the Serbians returning to Eastern 
Slavonia, that they would not get an autonomous region in Croatia and reintegration is their 
only variant
10
. If Ukraine happens to agree on practical implementation of “special status” for 
CADRL and signing additional “peace plans” with separatists at high level, it will be more 
likely to promote secession rather than reintegration of the occupied territories. 
Thirdly, reaching the agreement itself between the participants of the armed conflict is 
of crucial importance for the success of peacekeeping process. 
                                                          
8
 Basic agreement for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, http://undocs.org/en/%20S/1995/951 
(11.03.2019). 
9
 Ibidem. 
10
 J.-P. Klein, The United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES). Proceedings of 
the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law), Vol. 97 (April 2-5, 2003), p. 207 
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In this respect the experience of Dayton Peace Agreements of December 14, 1995 as an 
example of the elimination of undesired actors from the negotiation process is useful for Ukraine. 
Bosnian Serbs were the only obstacle on the way to reaching the agreement on postconflict 
peacebuilding. On the eve of Dayton negotiations they controlled about seventy per cent of the 
territory of Bosnia, gained as a result of a series of campaigns of ethnic cleansings and thus had 
more losses from peace plan on creation of multiethnical national government. This made their 
consent of critical importance for any kind of settlement. But the leadership of Bosnian Serbs was 
not present in Dayton. Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić were accused by the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) on the eve of negotiations for their role in 
mass murder of Muslims in Srebrenica. Because of abrupt position of the prosecutors and judges 
of the ICTY and the US Special Envoy to the Balkans Richard Holbrooke, who declared the 
necessity of arresting Karadžić and Mladić, Slobodan Milošević, the Serbian President at that 
time, signed the agreements in Dayton allegedly on behalf of Bosnian Serbs
11
. In this respect 
Milošević took the role of the representative of the whole “Serbian world”. This legal fiction was 
completely in the interests of other participants of Dayton negotiations. Such a stroke of 
diplomacy is also possible for reaching an agreement with Russia concerning the representation 
by Russian official persons of “DPR” and “LPR” at the negotiations without the participation of 
quasi-state subjects, which are qualified in Ukraine as terrorist organizations
12
. An additional 
argument of immediate involvement of the Russian party can be the recognition by the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe CADRL as “territories temporarily under 
the effective control of the Russian authorities” in 2018
13
. 
As in case with Ukraine, the parties to the conflicts often did not seek reconciliation 
especially on disadvantageous terms. E.g., during the conference in Rambouillet in February 
1999 aimed at peaceful settlement for Kosovo, Belgrade refused to sign draft agreements, as 
under numerous provisions of these documents Serbia de facto lost its sovereignty over 
Kosovo. Only after NATO bomb attacks in March 1999 aimed at gaining consent of Belgrade 
to the project, proposed in Rambouillet, the Serbian party reached the agreement on a peace 
plan with EU envoy Martti Ahtisaari and a special envoy of the Russian Federation Victor 
Chernomyrdin. Under the NATO military pressure Rambouillet project had triumphed
14
. 
Fourthly, the internationalization of the conflict and involvement of independent outside 
actors into post-conflict regulation are of great importance. 
                                                          
11
 Ф. Хартманн, Мир и наказание: Тайные войны международной политики и правосудия, Харьков 2018, 
c. 160-161. 
12
 Vide Заява Верховної Ради України «Про визнання Україною юрисдикції Міжнародного кримінального 
суду щодо скоєння злочинів проти людяності та воєнних злочинів вищими посадовими особами 
Російської Федерації та керівниками терористичних організацій «ДНР» та «ЛНР», які призвели до 
особливо тяжких наслідків та масового вбивства українських громадян» № 145-VIII від 04.02.2015 р., 
http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/145-19 (11.03.2019).  
13
 State of emergency: proportionality issues concerning derogations under Article 15 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights: Resolution 2209 (2018), http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HT 
ML-en.asp?fileid=24680&lang=ru (11.03.2019). 
14
 G. Fox, op.cit, p. 92. 
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In this respect the experience of deoccupation of East Timor is an example of political 
settlement, which can take Ukraine out of harmful discourse of “internal conflict” which is 
actively propagated by the Russian Federation in the information warfare against Ukraine. 
Indonesia occupied East Timor in 1975 after Portuguese colonial power left the isle. Though 
not a single country (except of Australia) acknowledged the sovereignty of Indonesia over the 
East Timor and the UN authorities described it as a case of incomplete decolonization
15
, there 
was not enough collective pressure to provide for withdrawal of the Indonesians. Moreover, 
unlike constant East Timor resistance to occupation the interest of international community to 
the situation occurring got weakened in a couple of years. In 1980s the tone of the UN 
resolutions got down significantly, they didn’t mention the right of people of East Timor to 
self-determination and the seizure of Indonesian occupation anymore
16
. Only Portugal was 
consistent in its advocating interests of East Timor and tried to come to common decision 
with Indonesia concerning the status of the occupied territory. Persistent efforts of this 
country ended in signing the agreement between the governments of Portugal and Indonesia 
on May 5, 1999, in which the determination of the political status of the island was put to the 
referendum
17
.  
It is worth saying that this peace agreement, just like in case of Balkan agreements, 
continued the discourse of preserving territorial integrity of the countries, which were the 
objects of postconflict peacebuilding. The document was only about granting East Timor the 
status of special autonomy within the unitary Republic of Indonesia
18
. The UNSC Resolution 
1246 (1999) adopted for the implementation of this agreement provided for holding a popular 
consultation “in order to ascertain whether the East Timorese people accept the proposed 
constitutional framework providing for a special autonomy for East Timor within the unitary 
Republic of Indonesia or reject the proposed special autonomy for East Timor”
19
. As in the case 
of Kosovo, the presumption of the autonomous status as an instrument for postconflict 
settlement was a time bomb waiting to explode, which opened the way for gaining sovereignty 
of the injured ethnos. 
In June 1999 the Security Council sent the United Nations mission in East Timor 
(UNAMET) for the organization and monitoring the voting. Seventy per cent of the 
inhabitants voted for the independence which resulted in an unrest and violence over 
indigenous population on the part of pro-Indonesian forces. Under the UN pressure and the 
perspective of economic sanctions, primarily from USA, which threatened to veto loans and 
aid amounting to billiards of dollars, Indonesia was forced to a wider United Nations mandate 
and implementation of peacekeeping mission
20
. On October 25, 1999 the Security Council 
                                                          
15
 GA Res. 389 (Apr. 22, 1976), http://undocs.org/en/S/RES/389 (11.03.2019). 
16
 Question of East Timor, GA Res. 37/3 (Nov. 23, 1982), http://undocs.org/en/A/RES/37/30 (11.03.2019). 
17
 Report of the Secretary-General, Question of East Timor, http://undocs.org/en/S/1999/513 (11.03.2019). 
18
 Ibidem. 
19
 UN Security Council Resolution 1246 (Jun. 11, 1999), http://undocs.org/en/S/RES/1246 (11.03.2019). 
20
 Р. Джеффрі, Злочини проти людства: Боротьба за правосуддя в усьому світі, Одеса 2006, с. 455-456. 
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adopted the Resolution 1272, which provided for creation of United Nations Transitional 
Administration in Eastern Timor (UNTAET)
21
. UNTAET ruled the territory for three years 
and ended on May 20, 2002 when East Timor became an independent UN member-state. 
The United Nations peacekeeping mission in East Timor shows that not only immediate 
participants of the armed conflict, but also other countries, which are ready to undertake the 
obligations of political participation in the settlement of a conflict can be parties to 
postconflict peacebuilding. In addition, if for reaching the agreements between the parties to 
conflict in Bosnia, Kosovo and Croatia on ending armed confrontation and postconflict 
regulation military coercion mostly from NATO to peace was of great importance, gaining 
agreement from Indonesia for presence of peacekeepers in East Timor became possible 
mostly due to economic pressure. It should be noted that the efficiency of this kind of 
influence was also conditioned by the fact that Indonesia was in hard economic condition due 
to Asian financial crisis of 1997, which resulted in political instability and fall of Suharto 
dictatorship in 1998. If comparing to Ukraine we can come to the conclusion that the chances 
for reaching the agreement with Russia on peaceful deoccupation of Donbas rise in case of 
economic weakening and political instability of the Kremlin. 
Taking into account the experience of peacekeeping missions in Balkans, the external 
actors, interested in peaceful regulation of the conflict in Donbas are to be European Union 
and the EU member states as conflict in Donbas is the biggest threat for the system of 
European security since the wars in Yugoslavia. Further the development of the negotiation 
process in “Normandy format” is perspective. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The history of creation of the United Nations Transitional Administration in Balkans 
and East Timor in 1990s shows that international and regional security actors, UN, NATO, 
OSCE, EU, demanded from participants of the armed conflicts the achievement of agreements 
concerning future peacebuilding. The measures of forcing diplomacy, e.g. military actions 
(Serbia and Croatia), economic sanctions (Indonesia), criminal prosecution (Bosnia) were of 
not least importance in the emergence of international administrators, who separated opposing 
parties. In case of Donbas the pressure over Russia in order to gain its agreement to peaceful 
reintegration of CADRL is to be secured mainly by the economic sanctions. 
The conditions of creation of international administration in East Timor, significant 
inequality of the parties, prolonged occupation, non-military enforcement actions on a party to 
a conflict are the closest to Ukrainian realities. In its turn the most applicable for reintegration 
of Ukrainian territories is the experience of United Nations Transitional Administration in 
East Slavonia. Two other missions, in Bosnia and Kosovo, were relatively successful, as they 
stopped the armed conflicts, but had negative political consequences for preserving the 
                                                          
21
 UN Security Council Resolution 1272 (Oct. 25, 1999), http://undocs.org/en/S/RES/1272(1999) (11.03.2019). 
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sovereignty of postconflict states. In first case, Bosnia failed to become a full-fledged state 
and the power in the country belongs to the so-called “three constitutional peoples”: Serbs, 
Bosnians and Croatians
22
. In the other case granting autonomous status to Kosovo under the 
international administration resulted in alienation of sovereignty of Serbia over this territory 
and proclaiming independence by Kosovo parliament in 2008
23
. The last mission is also an 
example of the dangers of peacekeeping process around autonomous status of one of the 
parties to a conflict. 
In the existing state of affairs the variant with international administration in Donbas 
under the auspices of the UN seems to be the only possible mechanism for deoccupation and 
reintegration of these territories. For this Ukraine is to get released from the institutional trap 
of Minsk Agreements, which were entered into at a disadvantage of the threat of a full-scale 
war with Russian Federation in 2014-2015 and produce a discourse of “internal conflict” in 
Donbas. Presently new international documents are required which would directly provide for 
the creation of United Nations Transitional Administration in Donbas with accessory role of 
OSCE authorities (holding local elections and creation of democratic institutions) and EU 
(donation and economic reconstruction). The most acceptable variant will be signing 
multilateral document in “Normandy format”: between Ukraine (power giving its consent to 
transitional administration of its sovereign territories), the Russian Federation (occupying 
power, giving its consent to seizure of effective control over CADRL), Germany and France 
(intermediaries in peacekeeping process). 
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